

Mr. Ken Turner, Col. ; Col. Arthur, Gen. Arthur, Cleland, Unger, Celly, DE  
Bauer, Stone, Poats, Cooper.

Angren of Feb 5 on Pac.

[ Presumption (alleged?) problems:

1. Inadequate CT planning, coord
2. Inadequate integration of US advice in the field: promise, distrust.

Arthur: problem in the field, not centralized direction from Saigon. Problems  
in range of police security, economic development.

Celly: Doctrine in this Angren is fine; still ahead if they now accept it.  
Problems are in execution.

Poats: lack of offensive action: political offensive by gov, rooting out  
infrastructure (lack of police strength).

Turner: Danger is in transition period after departure of Ang, before civilians go  
take hold. National, provincial, popular police; Need advice  
down to sub-sector level (hamlet, village).

AID having trouble getting enough sector advisors (below province); Ang has  
advisory capabilities. No wish to eliminate AID; just to take over advisory  
role till transition period is over. (everywhere?!) MP's. ~~Not~~

N



Aug, Colonel: When any ARVN moves out, with its US advisor,  
another US advisor should move in  
Down to district (not hamlet) 239 districts, 16000 villages  
[Should US/VN "man on the spot" be an MP-type,  
adapted to occupation duty? or be like VC  
infrastructure.

[Colly view of dealing directly with the people

Author: what is wanted corresponds to Popular Force; make  
them adequate to jobs.

- a) Training; political indoctrination
- b) lack of fast reaction force
- c) failure to root out infrastructure?

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PACIFICATION PROBLEMS IN VIET-NAM

I. GENERAL

*How does present "choice between governments"?*

The progress of the Communist "war of liberation" consists first of gaining the support of certain elements of a target population; secondly of isolating that population from the central government; and thirdly of substituting a Communist government for the former central government (viz. Cuba). At the present time the VC have so effectively isolated large segments of the Vietnamese peasantry that there is no longer any possibility of choice for populations in VC controlled areas as between a Communist and a non-Communist Government. On the record, the Vietnamese peasant will choose any feasible alternative to Communist Government. The work of pacification should be to create a condition of lasting physical security to allow the possibility of choice and to implant a government program which makes the choice of the non-Communist alternative even more attractive.

In such a pacification effort civilian and military efforts must necessarily intertwine and to achieve the desired end are essentially inseparable. Experience shows, however, that a population cannot be provided pacification but must achieve it by cooperation with, involvement in and commitment to the forces of pacification. Self-interest, social justice, and defense of native lands are primary

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motivations in achieving this commitment. Military, psychological, social, economic and political factors must be considered in each step of the pacification process. Any step taken which ignores one or more of these factors risks failure.

II. PACIFICATION

Lasting physical security has not been provided for the population. This is necessary to offer the people the opportunity to choose between Viet Cong and GVN and permit the functioning of effective civil government. Some positive idea, cause or program which is appealing to and accepted by the people, and effective civil government, are essential, mutually supporting concomitants to getting physical security.

Questions:

1. What is being done to identify and eliminate the Viet Cong political infra-structure at village-hamlet level?
2. What are major limitations to securing commitment of population to defend themselves and support the GVN?
3. What is being done to use locally recruited forces in their home area to capitalize on their local knowledge and natural motivation to protect their homes?
4. How and to what extent are special interest groups (e.g. Buddhists, Catholics, students, labor, sects, political parties) brought into the pacification effort?
5. Is training and discipline of troops adequate with respect to relationships with civilian populace? With captured Viet Cong?

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6. Do regional and popular forces have missions other than purely military operations; what training do they receive for these other missions, and how effective are they?
7. What balance should be struck between (a) regular phased military operations in priority areas and (b) building on existing scattered strong points and secured areas?
8. What capabilities do the National Police have to provide law and order, tactical intelligence and resources control in rural areas?
9. What is the present GVN/US concept with respect to civil defense as opposed to normal military and paramilitary forces?
10. What is the proper short-run and long-term balance between making US inputs of materiel, advice and pressure through (a) national ministries vs. (b) direct to province chiefs?
11. How can we assure rapid and adequate piaster funding of pacification operations at all levels?
12. In the event a hamlet is attacked or reports VC movement in its area, what operational plans and forces exist to insure immediate relief?
13. To what extent are national and local level intelligence and counter-intelligence systems and personnel adequate for and oriented on the pacification function.
14. What provisions are made to ensure the continuance of accelerated programs begun during pacification after the outside catalytic forces and resources move on.

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III. GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION

At present, the Vietnamese are not mobilizing their energies to meet the insurgency. There is no unifying concept, easily understood by the entire nation, toward which they strive. Neither is there adequate central GVN coordination, direction and support of all aspects of the pacification program. The tools for pacification are present. The problem is to organize equipment, supplies, and effort so they can be used politically, to win commitment from the rural population. Strategic hamlets provided one concept toward which pacification efforts could be organized, and their success in some areas proves the concept is workable.

At the top, it is vital to have a GVN at least superficially unified, capable of giving coherent direction to pacification and accepting national responsibility for the acts of its agents. In the provinces it is essential that the local government be responsive to the people, be capable of using personnel and material resources available and that the government have full authority to act.

Questions:

1. How are resources of civilian ministries such as Public Health or Public Works made available to and integrated into the pacification program.
2. How are pacification cadre and local officials selected and motivated; how adequate is the training they receive?
3. How are the activities of pacification cadre coordinated with ministry representatives at local levels? With the province and district chief?

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4. To what extent are military officers, civilian officials and cadre clear on how they reinforce each other in pacifying a given area (village level, for instance)?
5. To what extent are GVN representatives from all ministries operational in the provinces? How were they selected and on what criteria? To whom are they responsible?
6. Does the population in hamlets undergoing pacification understand what the GVN is attempting? Do military clearing operations set the stage for non-military pacification programs, or do they further antagonize the population?
7. Does the whole GVN organizational structure for pacification aim at a simple, concrete goal that is understandable to the lowest cadre as well as the Saigon authorities?
8. From whom does the province chief receive his orders with respect to pacification activities?
9. What personnel, funds, and materiel resources does the province chief/ sector commander control?
10. How does the province chief bring problem areas to the attention of Saigon authorities, and how are these problems resolved?
11. What is the relationship between a province/district chief and a regimental/battalion commander whose unit is operating in the sector or subsector? What are the roles of the corps and division in pacification.

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US ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION

The concept underlying the total pacification effort envisions a full scale campaign consisting of a wide range of civil and military programs, conducted in concert toward a common goal. The military effort is truly effective only when it directly supports, and is closely coordinated with the various civil programs. If the U.S. Mission is to provide full support to the GVN it is essential that all U.S. agencies agree on the basic concepts of pacification. These agreed basic concepts must be translated into coordinated U.S. plans and programs to ensure that U.S. advice, assistance and support to the Vietnamese is consistent and fully effective. This unity of effort within the US Mission is essential if we are to bring maximum influence to bear on the inexperienced and marginally competent Vietnamese who occupy the positions of leadership in the ministries, the military and the provinces.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the common conceptual and doctrinal basis for US civil-military advice and support to the GVN at governmental (ministerial), corps (regional), and province levels?
2. What are the planning and programming methods used by the various United States agencies and how are they coordinated by the U.S. Mission?

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3. What are the coordinating mechanisms for insuring unity of US mission effort at governmental, corps/regional, province and district levels?

4. In what manner are the decisions of the Mission Council translated into action?

5. Could an interagency action group under a Chief of Staff or Executive for pacification assist in coordination and implementation of U.S. pacification activities?

6. What measures are in force to assure that all U.S. personnel are kept informed and understand the political, military, economic, social and psychological factors at play in the Vietnamese insurgency and how can we broaden this knowledge and understanding?

7. To what extent do purely US administrative and operational requirements impede assistance to the Vietnamese?

V. US/GVN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

It is essential to meld the US effort with the GVN pacification effort. This requires that the US ~~box~~ identify itself completely with the GVN effort and that US planning actions consider and accept Vietnamese thinking, capabilities and desires; the Vietnamese must be accessories before, during and after the fact. This identification with the Vietnamese and the ability to ensure their acceptance of programs is directly related to the contribution they have made in the

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development of the program and the extent they are convinced of its efficacy. This joint acceptance of concepts and actions must take place at all levels within the US and GVN organization.

Questions

1. What are the jointly (US/GVN) agreed objectives of pacification?
2. What jointly agreed programs mobilize US and GVN military and civilian resources for pacification?
3. What roles do the US and the GVN each play in developing these programs?
4. What actions are under way to publicize and gain support for these objectives and programs?
5. What are the mechanisms or systems bringing US and GVN action level agencies and individuals together in implementation of these programs: in Saigon at ministerial level, at corps/regional level, at province/sector level and at district/subsector level?
6. How are US/GVN differences resolved at lower echelons and what are the methods for bringing unresolved problems to the attention of the next higher level?
7. Are GVN and US orders to subordinates in consonance with each other and with the pacification program?
8. What procedures are in effect to report and resolve instances where GVN personnel reject or default on

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recommendations made by US advisors?

9. How can we assure that estimates of time required for completion of phased pacification operations do not become translated into deadlines which place operational agencies under pressure to report a phase completed when in fact it is not?

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